Clean up the oopsie. Rebuild the blank exercises.

This commit is contained in:
Michael Frank
2021-05-09 00:39:21 +12:00
parent b984cb4c6f
commit d28d80c46f
1565 changed files with 27186 additions and 199003 deletions
+36 -2
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,26 @@ var assignInWith = require('./assignInWith'),
templateSettings = require('./templateSettings'),
toString = require('./toString');
/** Error message constants. */
var INVALID_TEMPL_VAR_ERROR_TEXT = 'Invalid `variable` option passed into `_.template`';
/** Used to match empty string literals in compiled template source. */
var reEmptyStringLeading = /\b__p \+= '';/g,
reEmptyStringMiddle = /\b(__p \+=) '' \+/g,
reEmptyStringTrailing = /(__e\(.*?\)|\b__t\)) \+\n'';/g;
/**
* Used to validate the `validate` option in `_.template` variable.
*
* Forbids characters which could potentially change the meaning of the function argument definition:
* - "()," (modification of function parameters)
* - "=" (default value)
* - "[]{}" (destructuring of function parameters)
* - "/" (beginning of a comment)
* - whitespace
*/
var reForbiddenIdentifierChars = /[()=,{}\[\]\/\s]/;
/**
* Used to match
* [ES template delimiters](http://ecma-international.org/ecma-262/7.0/#sec-template-literal-lexical-components).
@@ -27,6 +42,12 @@ var reNoMatch = /($^)/;
/** Used to match unescaped characters in compiled string literals. */
var reUnescapedString = /['\n\r\u2028\u2029\\]/g;
/** Used for built-in method references. */
var objectProto = Object.prototype;
/** Used to check objects for own properties. */
var hasOwnProperty = objectProto.hasOwnProperty;
/**
* Creates a compiled template function that can interpolate data properties
* in "interpolate" delimiters, HTML-escape interpolated data properties in
@@ -162,7 +183,14 @@ function template(string, options, guard) {
, 'g');
// Use a sourceURL for easier debugging.
var sourceURL = 'sourceURL' in options ? '//# sourceURL=' + options.sourceURL + '\n' : '';
// The sourceURL gets injected into the source that's eval-ed, so be careful
// to normalize all kinds of whitespace, so e.g. newlines (and unicode versions of it) can't sneak in
// and escape the comment, thus injecting code that gets evaled.
var sourceURL = hasOwnProperty.call(options, 'sourceURL')
? ('//# sourceURL=' +
(options.sourceURL + '').replace(/\s/g, ' ') +
'\n')
: '';
string.replace(reDelimiters, function(match, escapeValue, interpolateValue, esTemplateValue, evaluateValue, offset) {
interpolateValue || (interpolateValue = esTemplateValue);
@@ -193,10 +221,16 @@ function template(string, options, guard) {
// If `variable` is not specified wrap a with-statement around the generated
// code to add the data object to the top of the scope chain.
var variable = options.variable;
var variable = hasOwnProperty.call(options, 'variable') && options.variable;
if (!variable) {
source = 'with (obj) {\n' + source + '\n}\n';
}
// Throw an error if a forbidden character was found in `variable`, to prevent
// potential command injection attacks.
else if (reForbiddenIdentifierChars.test(variable)) {
throw new Error(INVALID_TEMPL_VAR_ERROR_TEXT);
}
// Cleanup code by stripping empty strings.
source = (isEvaluating ? source.replace(reEmptyStringLeading, '') : source)
.replace(reEmptyStringMiddle, '$1')