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Updated unbound.conf. Updated README.

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Ubuntu
2020-09-10 20:25:56 +00:00
parent 60ca90e778
commit a55224b7e7
2 changed files with 337 additions and 354 deletions
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README.md
+43 -2
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@@ -102,10 +102,14 @@ wireguard | [cont-init.d] done.
wireguard | [services.d] starting services wireguard | [services.d] starting services
``` ```
---
## Recommended configuration / Split tunnel: ## Recommended configuration / Split tunnel:
Modify your wireguard client `AllowedIps` to `10.2.0.0/24` to only tunnel the web panel and DNS traffic. Modify your wireguard client `AllowedIps` to `10.2.0.0/24` to only tunnel the web panel and DNS traffic.
---
## Access PiHole ## Access PiHole
While connected to WireGuard, navigate to http://10.2.0.100/admin While connected to WireGuard, navigate to http://10.2.0.100/admin
@@ -134,6 +138,44 @@ wireguard:
--- ---
## Modifying the upstream DNS provider for Unbound
If you choose to not use Cloudflare any reason you are able to modify the upstream DNS provider in `unbound.conf`.
Search for `forward-zone` and modify the IP addresses for your chosen DNS provider.
>**NOTE:** The anything after `#` is a comment on the line.
What this means is it is just there to tell you which DNS provider you put there. It is for you to be able to reference later. I recommend updating this if you change your DNS provider from the default values.
```yaml
forward-zone:
name: "."
forward-addr: 1.1.1.1@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-addr: 1.0.0.1@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1111@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1001@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-tls-upstream: yes
```
---
## Available DNS Providers
While you can actually use any upstream provider you want, the team over at pi-hole.net provide a fantastic break down along with all needed information of some of the more popular providers here:
https://docs.pi-hole.net/guides/upstream-dns-providers/
Providers they have the information for:
1. Google
2. OpenDNS
3. Level3
4. Comodo
5. DNS.WATCH
6. Quad9
7. CloudFlare DNS
---
## Author ## Author
@@ -150,5 +192,4 @@ Contributions, issues and feature requests are welcome!<br />Feel free to check
Give a ⭐ if this project helped you! Give a ⭐ if this project helped you!
<a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/stoxe" target="_blank"><img src="https://cdn.buymeacoffee.com/buttons/default-orange.png" alt="Buy Me A Coffee" style="height: 51px !important;width: 217px !important;" ></a> <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/stoxe" target="_blank"><img src="https://cdn.buymeacoffee.com/buttons/v2/default-orange.png" alt="Buy Me A Coffee" style="height: 60px !important;width: 217px !important;" ></a>
unbound/unbound.conf
+294 -352
View File
@@ -1,362 +1,302 @@
# server:
# ###########################################################################
# # BASIC SETTINGS
# ###########################################################################
# # Time to live maximum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the maximum
# # kicks in, responses to clients still get decrementing TTLs based on the
# # original (larger) values. When the internal TTL expires, the cache item
# # has expired. Can be set lower to force the resolver to query for data
# # often, and not trust (very large) TTL values.
# cache-max-ttl: 86400
# # Time to live minimum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the minimum
# # kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain owner intended,
# # and thus less queries are made to look up the data. Zero makes sure the
# # data in the cache is as the domain owner intended, higher values,
# # especially more than an hour or so, can lead to trouble as the data in
# # the cache does not match up with the actual data any more.
# cache-min-ttl: 300
# # Set the working directory for the program.
# directory: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
# # RFC 6891. Number of bytes size to advertise as the EDNS reassembly buffer
# # size. This is the value put into datagrams over UDP towards peers.
# # 4096 is RFC recommended. 1472 has a reasonable chance to fit within a
# # single Ethernet frame, thus lessing the chance of fragmentation
# # reassembly problems (usually seen as timeouts). Setting to 512 bypasses
# # even the most stringent path MTU problems, but is not recommended since
# # the amount of TCP fallback generated is excessive.
# edns-buffer-size: 1472
# # Listen to for queries from clients and answer from this network interface
# # and port.
# interface: 0.0.0.0@53
# # Rotates RRSet order in response (the pseudo-random number is taken from
# # the query ID, for speed and thread safety).
# rrset-roundrobin: yes
# # Drop user privileges after binding the port.
# username: "_unbound"
# ###########################################################################
# # LOGGING
# ###########################################################################
# # Do not print log lines to inform about local zone actions
# log-local-actions: no
# # Do not print one line per query to the log
# log-queries: no
# # Do not print one line per reply to the log
# log-replies: no
# # Do not print log lines that say why queries return SERVFAIL to clients
# log-servfail: no
# # Further limit logging
# logfile: /dev/null
# # Only log errors
# verbosity: 5
# ###########################################################################
# # PRIVACY SETTINGS
# ###########################################################################
# # RFC 8198. Use the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDO-MAIN and other
# # denials, using information from previous NXDO-MAINs answers. In other
# # words, use cached NSEC records to generate negative answers within a
# # range and positive answers from wildcards. This increases performance,
# # decreases latency and resource utilization on both authoritative and
# # recursive servers, and increases privacy. Also, it may help increase
# # resilience to certain DoS attacks in some circumstances.
# aggressive-nsec: yes
# # Extra delay for timeouted UDP ports before they are closed, in msec.
# # This prevents very delayed answer packets from the upstream (recursive)
# # servers from bouncing against closed ports and setting off all sort of
# # close-port counters, with eg. 1500 msec. When timeouts happen you need
# # extra sockets, it checks the ID and remote IP of packets, and unwanted
# # packets are added to the unwanted packet counter.
# delay-close: 10000
# # Prevent the unbound server from forking into the background as a daemon
# do-daemonize: no
# # Add localhost to the do-not-query-address list.
# do-not-query-localhost: no
# # Number of bytes size of the aggressive negative cache.
# neg-cache-size: 4M
# # Send minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
# # privacy (best privacy).
# qname-minimisation: yes
# ###########################################################################
# # SECURITY SETTINGS
# ###########################################################################
# # Only give access to recursion clients from LAN IPs
# access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
# access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow
# access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow
# access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow
# # access-control: fc00::/7 allow
# # access-control: ::1/128 allow
# # File with trust anchor for one zone, which is tracked with RFC5011
# # probes.
# auto-trust-anchor-file: "var/root.key"
# # Enable chroot (i.e, change apparent root directory for the current
# # running process and its children)
# chroot: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
# # Deny queries of type ANY with an empty response.
# deny-any: yes
# # Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
# # advertised in the DS record.
# harden-algo-downgrade: yes
# # RFC 8020. returns nxdomain to queries for a name below another name that
# # is already known to be nxdomain.
# harden-below-nxdomain: yes
# # Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
# # zone becomes bogus. If turned off you run the risk of a downgrade attack
# # that disables security for a zone.
# harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# # Only trust glue if it is within the servers authority.
# harden-glue: yes
# # Ignore very large queries.
# harden-large-queries: yes
# # Perform additional queries for infrastructure data to harden the referral
# # path. Validates the replies if trust anchors are configured and the zones
# # are signed. This enforces DNSSEC validation on nameserver NS sets and the
# # nameserver addresses that are encountered on the referral path to the
# # answer. Experimental option.
# harden-referral-path: no
# # Ignore very small EDNS buffer sizes from queries.
# harden-short-bufsize: yes
# # Refuse id.server and hostname.bind queries
# hide-identity: yes
# # Refuse version.server and version.bind queries
# hide-version: yes
# # Report this identity rather than the hostname of the server.
# identity: "DNS"
# # These private network addresses are not allowed to be returned for public
# # internet names. Any occurrence of such addresses are removed from DNS
# # answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the answers bogus.
# # This protects against DNS Rebinding
# private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
# private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
# private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
# private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
# # private-address: fd00::/8
# # private-address: fe80::/10
# # private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
# # Enable ratelimiting of queries (per second) sent to nameserver for
# # performing recursion. More queries are turned away with an error
# # (servfail). This stops recursive floods (e.g., random query names), but
# # not spoofed reflection floods. Cached responses are not rate limited by
# # this setting. Experimental option.
# ratelimit: 1000
# # Use this certificate bundle for authenticating connections made to
# # outside peers (e.g., auth-zone urls, DNS over TLS connections).
# tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
# # Set the total number of unwanted replies to eep track of in every thread.
# # When it reaches the threshold, a defensive action of clearing the rrset
# # and message caches is taken, hopefully flushing away any poison.
# # Unbound suggests a value of 10 million.
# unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
# # Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts. This
# # perturbs the lowercase and uppercase of query names sent to authority
# # servers and checks if the reply still has the correct casing.
# # This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
# # Experimental option.
# use-caps-for-id: yes
# # Help protect users that rely on this validator for authentication from
# # potentially bad data in the additional section. Instruct the validator to
# # remove data from the additional section of secure messages that are not
# # signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus, indeterminate or
# # unchecked are not affected.
# val-clean-additional: yes
# ###########################################################################
# # PERFORMANCE SETTINGS
# ###########################################################################
# # https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/howto-optimise/
# # https://nlnetlabs.nl/news/2019/Feb/05/unbound-1.9.0-released/
# # Number of slabs in the infrastructure cache. Slabs reduce lock contention
# # by threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
# infra-cache-slabs: 4
# # Number of incoming TCP buffers to allocate per thread. Default
# # is 10. If set to 0, or if do-tcp is "no", no TCP queries from
# # clients are accepted. For larger installations increasing this
# # value is a good idea.
# incoming-num-tcp: 10
# # Number of slabs in the key cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# # threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number
# # of cpus is a reasonable guess.
# key-cache-slabs: 4
# # Number of bytes size of the message cache.
# # Unbound recommendation is to Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory
# # as you use msg cache memory.
# msg-cache-size: 855658496
# # Number of slabs in the message cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# # threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number of
# # cpus is a reasonable guess.
# msg-cache-slabs: 4
# # The number of queries that every thread will service simultaneously. If
# # more queries arrive that need servicing, and no queries can be jostled
# # out (see jostle-timeout), then the queries are dropped.
# # This is best set at half the number of the outgoing-range.
# # This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
# # use more than 1024 file descriptors.
# num-queries-per-thread: 4096
# # The number of threads to create to serve clients.
# # This is set dynamically at run time to effectively use available CPUs
# # resources
# num-threads: 2
# # Number of ports to open. This number of file descriptors can be opened
# # per thread.
# # This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
# # use more than 1024 file descriptors.
# outgoing-range: 8192
# # Number of bytes size of the RRset cache.
# # Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory as msg cache memory
# rrset-cache-size: 1711316992
# # Number of slabs in the RRset cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# # threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
# rrset-cache-slabs: 4
# # Do no insert authority/additional sections into response messages when
# # those sections are not required. This reduces response size
# # significantly, and may avoid TCP fallback for some responses. This may
# # cause a slight speedup.
# minimal-responses: yes
# # # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record
# # is encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of
# # little more CPU usage.
# prefetch: yes
# # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record is
# # encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of little
# # more CPU usage.
# prefetch-key: yes
# # Have unbound attempt to serve old responses from cache with a TTL of 0 in
# # the response without waiting for the actual resolution to finish. The
# # actual resolution answer ends up in the cache later on.
# serve-expired: yes
# # Open dedicated listening sockets for incoming queries for each thread and
# # try to set the SO_REUSEPORT socket option on each socket. May distribute
# # incoming queries to threads more evenly.
# so-reuseport: yes
# ###########################################################################
# # LOCAL ZONE
# ###########################################################################
# # # Include file for local-data and local-data-ptr
# # include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/a-records.conf
# # include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/srv-records.conf
# # ###########################################################################
# # # FORWARD ZONE
# # ###########################################################################
# # include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/forward-records.conf
# remote-control:
# control-enable: no
server: server:
verbosity: 1 ###########################################################################
num-threads: 3 # BASIC SETTINGS
interface: 0.0.0.0@53 ###########################################################################
so-reuseport: yes # Time to live maximum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the maximum
edns-buffer-size: 1472 # kicks in, responses to clients still get decrementing TTLs based on the
delay-close: 10000 # original (larger) values. When the internal TTL expires, the cache item
cache-min-ttl: 60 # has expired. Can be set lower to force the resolver to query for data
# often, and not trust (very large) TTL values.
cache-max-ttl: 86400 cache-max-ttl: 86400
do-daemonize: no
username: "_unbound" # Time to live minimum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the minimum
log-queries: no # kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain owner intended,
hide-version: yes # and thus less queries are made to look up the data. Zero makes sure the
hide-identity: yes # data in the cache is as the domain owner intended, higher values,
identity: "DNS" # especially more than an hour or so, can lead to trouble as the data in
harden-algo-downgrade: yes # the cache does not match up with the actual data any more.
harden-short-bufsize: yes cache-min-ttl: 60
harden-large-queries: yes
harden-glue: yes # Set the working directory for the program.
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
harden-below-nxdomain: yes
harden-referral-path: no
do-not-query-localhost: no
prefetch: yes
prefetch-key: yes
qname-minimisation: yes
aggressive-nsec: yes
ratelimit: 1000
rrset-roundrobin: yes
minimal-responses: yes
chroot: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
directory: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound" directory: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
auto-trust-anchor-file: "var/root.key"
num-queries-per-thread: 4096 # RFC 6891. Number of bytes size to advertise as the EDNS reassembly buffer
outgoing-range: 8192 # size. This is the value put into datagrams over UDP towards peers.
msg-cache-size: 260991658 # 4096 is RFC recommended. 1472 has a reasonable chance to fit within a
rrset-cache-size: 260991658 # single Ethernet frame, thus lessing the chance of fragmentation
# reassembly problems (usually seen as timeouts). Setting to 512 bypasses
# even the most stringent path MTU problems, but is not recommended since
# the amount of TCP fallback generated is excessive.
edns-buffer-size: 1472
# Listen to for queries from clients and answer from this network interface
# and port.
interface: 0.0.0.0@53
# Rotates RRSet order in response (the pseudo-random number is taken from
# the query ID, for speed and thread safety).
rrset-roundrobin: yes
# Drop user privileges after binding the port.
username: "_unbound"
###########################################################################
# LOGGING
###########################################################################
# Do not print log lines to inform about local zone actions
log-local-actions: no
# Do not print one line per query to the log
log-queries: no
# Do not print one line per reply to the log
log-replies: no
# Do not print log lines that say why queries return SERVFAIL to clients
log-servfail: no
# Further limit logging
logfile: /dev/null
# Only log errors
verbosity: 5
###########################################################################
# PRIVACY SETTINGS
###########################################################################
# RFC 8198. Use the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDO-MAIN and other
# denials, using information from previous NXDO-MAINs answers. In other
# words, use cached NSEC records to generate negative answers within a
# range and positive answers from wildcards. This increases performance,
# decreases latency and resource utilization on both authoritative and
# recursive servers, and increases privacy. Also, it may help increase
# resilience to certain DoS attacks in some circumstances.
aggressive-nsec: yes
# Extra delay for timeouted UDP ports before they are closed, in msec.
# This prevents very delayed answer packets from the upstream (recursive)
# servers from bouncing against closed ports and setting off all sort of
# close-port counters, with eg. 1500 msec. When timeouts happen you need
# extra sockets, it checks the ID and remote IP of packets, and unwanted
# packets are added to the unwanted packet counter.
delay-close: 10000
# Prevent the unbound server from forking into the background as a daemon
do-daemonize: no
# Add localhost to the do-not-query-address list.
do-not-query-localhost: no
# Number of bytes size of the aggressive negative cache.
neg-cache-size: 4M neg-cache-size: 4M
serve-expired: yes
unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000 # Send minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
use-caps-for-id: yes # privacy (best privacy).
val-clean-additional: yes qname-minimisation: yes
tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
###########################################################################
# SECURITY SETTINGS
###########################################################################
# Only give access to recursion clients from LAN IPs
access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow
access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow
access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow
# access-control: fc00::/7 allow
# access-control: ::1/128 allow
# File with trust anchor for one zone, which is tracked with RFC5011
# probes.
auto-trust-anchor-file: "var/root.key"
# Enable chroot (i.e, change apparent root directory for the current
# running process and its children)
chroot: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
# Deny queries of type ANY with an empty response.
#deny-any: yes
# Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
# advertised in the DS record.
harden-algo-downgrade: yes
# RFC 8020. returns nxdomain to queries for a name below another name that
# is already known to be nxdomain.
harden-below-nxdomain: yes
# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
# zone becomes bogus. If turned off you run the risk of a downgrade attack
# that disables security for a zone.
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# Only trust glue if it is within the servers authority.
harden-glue: yes
# Ignore very large queries.
harden-large-queries: yes
# Perform additional queries for infrastructure data to harden the referral
# path. Validates the replies if trust anchors are configured and the zones
# are signed. This enforces DNSSEC validation on nameserver NS sets and the
# nameserver addresses that are encountered on the referral path to the
# answer. Experimental option.
harden-referral-path: no
# Ignore very small EDNS buffer sizes from queries.
harden-short-bufsize: yes
# Refuse id.server and hostname.bind queries
hide-identity: yes
# Refuse version.server and version.bind queries
hide-version: yes
# Report this identity rather than the hostname of the server.
identity: "DNS"
# These private network addresses are not allowed to be returned for public
# internet names. Any occurrence of such addresses are removed from DNS
# answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the answers bogus.
# This protects against DNS Rebinding
private-address: 10.0.0.0/8 private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
private-address: 172.16.0.0/12 private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
private-address: 192.168.0.0/16 private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
private-address: 169.254.0.0/16 private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
private-address: fd00::/8 # private-address: fd00::/8
private-address: fe80::/10 # private-address: fe80::/10
private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96 # private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
access-control: 192.168.1.1/24 allow # Enable ratelimiting of queries (per second) sent to nameserver for
access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow # performing recursion. More queries are turned away with an error
access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow # (servfail). This stops recursive floods (e.g., random query names), but
logfile: /var/log/unbound.log # not spoofed reflection floods. Cached responses are not rate limited by
#include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/a-records.conf # this setting. Experimental option.
ratelimit: 1000
# Use this certificate bundle for authenticating connections made to
# outside peers (e.g., auth-zone urls, DNS over TLS connections).
tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
# Set the total number of unwanted replies to eep track of in every thread.
# When it reaches the threshold, a defensive action of clearing the rrset
# and message caches is taken, hopefully flushing away any poison.
# Unbound suggests a value of 10 million.
unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
# Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts. This
# perturbs the lowercase and uppercase of query names sent to authority
# servers and checks if the reply still has the correct casing.
# This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
# Experimental option.
use-caps-for-id: yes
# Help protect users that rely on this validator for authentication from
# potentially bad data in the additional section. Instruct the validator to
# remove data from the additional section of secure messages that are not
# signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus, indeterminate or
# unchecked are not affected.
val-clean-additional: yes
###########################################################################
# PERFORMANCE SETTINGS
###########################################################################
# https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/howto-optimise/
# https://nlnetlabs.nl/news/2019/Feb/05/unbound-1.9.0-released/
# Number of slabs in the infrastructure cache. Slabs reduce lock contention
# by threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
# infra-cache-slabs: 4
# Number of incoming TCP buffers to allocate per thread. Default
# is 10. If set to 0, or if do-tcp is "no", no TCP queries from
# clients are accepted. For larger installations increasing this
# value is a good idea.
# incoming-num-tcp: 10
# Number of slabs in the key cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number
# of cpus is a reasonable guess.
# key-cache-slabs: 4
# Number of bytes size of the message cache.
# Unbound recommendation is to Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory
# as you use msg cache memory.
msg-cache-size: 260991658
# Number of slabs in the message cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number of
# cpus is a reasonable guess.
#msg-cache-slabs: 4
# The number of queries that every thread will service simultaneously. If
# more queries arrive that need servicing, and no queries can be jostled
# out (see jostle-timeout), then the queries are dropped.
# This is best set at half the number of the outgoing-range.
# This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
# use more than 1024 file descriptors.
num-queries-per-thread: 4096
# The number of threads to create to serve clients.
# This is set dynamically at run time to effectively use available CPUs
# resources
num-threads: 3
# Number of ports to open. This number of file descriptors can be opened
# per thread.
# This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
# use more than 1024 file descriptors.
outgoing-range: 8192
# Number of bytes size of the RRset cache.
# Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory as msg cache memory
rrset-cache-size: 260991658
# Number of slabs in the RRset cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
# threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
#rrset-cache-slabs: 4
# Do no insert authority/additional sections into response messages when
# those sections are not required. This reduces response size
# significantly, and may avoid TCP fallback for some responses. This may
# cause a slight speedup.
minimal-responses: yes
# # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record
# is encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of
# little more CPU usage.
prefetch: yes
# Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record is
# encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of little
# more CPU usage.
prefetch-key: yes
# Have unbound attempt to serve old responses from cache with a TTL of 0 in
# the response without waiting for the actual resolution to finish. The
# actual resolution answer ends up in the cache later on.
serve-expired: yes
# Open dedicated listening sockets for incoming queries for each thread and
# try to set the SO_REUSEPORT socket option on each socket. May distribute
# incoming queries to threads more evenly.
so-reuseport: yes
###########################################################################
# LOCAL ZONE
###########################################################################
# # Include file for local-data and local-data-ptr
# include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/a-records.conf
# include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/srv-records.conf
# ###########################################################################
# # FORWARD ZONE
# ###########################################################################
# include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/forward-records.conf
forward-zone: forward-zone:
name: "." name: "."
forward-addr: 1.1.1.1@853#cloudflare-dns.com forward-addr: 1.1.1.1@853#cloudflare-dns.com
@@ -364,5 +304,7 @@ server:
forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1111@853#cloudflare-dns.com forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1111@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1001@853#cloudflare-dns.com forward-addr: 2606:4700:4700::1001@853#cloudflare-dns.com
forward-tls-upstream: yes forward-tls-upstream: yes
remote-control: remote-control:
control-enable: no control-enable: no